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The analysis of proportions is interesting and noteworthy in that there are no 
commonly accepted regression models for analyzing proportions; indeed, researchers 
most often use ordinary least squares to estimate the parameters of a linear regression 
model for proportional data.  Such an approach, however, violates several assumptions of 
the Classical Linear Regression Model.  This report outlines the general linear model and 
the problems associated with using this approach to model proportions and considers a 
variety of alternate approaches that researchers have taken to model proportions.  These 
alternatives include transforming the dependent variable, a censored regression (Tobit) 
model, a Fractional Logit model, and Beta Regression.  All of the approaches considered 
are implemented in a case study analyzing Rice party difference scores in the 93rd to 108th 
Congress.  A comparison of the results from each approach confirms the findings of other 
researchers that Beta regression is the most preferred approach for modeling proportions.        
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In Political Science research, scholars often analyze a proportion or some other 
measure bounded from 0 to 1 as the dependent variable.  Due to the fact that a proportion 
cannot take on any value outside of this interval, variables in the form of a proportion are 
a type of Limited Dependent Variables.  Limited Dependent Variables are those “for 
which observations are limited to a certain range” (Kmenta 1997: 560).  Variables in the 
form of proportions are not the only type of Limited Dependent Variable.  Other 
instances in which the range of values the dependent variable can take on is limited 
include when the dependent variable is censored or truncated.  Censoring occurs when 
certain values of the dependent variable are unobservable, resulting in missing 
information.  Truncation occurs in samples in which not only the values of the dependent 
variable are unobservable, but also, as a result, the values of the corresponding 
independent variables are unobservable and the number of missing observations is 
unknown (Kmenta 1997).  Dependent variables with discrete outcomes, such as binary 
variables, some types of ordinal variables, and count variables, are also limited dependent 
variables in that the values that those types of variables can take on are restricted in some 
way (Long 1997).      
  Studies that examine how a variety of independent variables influence a 
proportion or vector of proportions can be divided into two categories.  The first category 
analyzes single proportions and the second category analyzes multiple proportions (Buis 
2010).  This report, however, only focuses on the first category of single proportions.  
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Analysis of proportional data is interesting and noteworthy in that there are no commonly 
accepted regression models for analyzing proportions; indeed, researchers most often use 
ordinary least squares to estimate the parameters of a linear regression model for 
proportional data (Kieschnick and McCullough 2003).  As this report will demonstrate, 
such an approach violates several assumptions of the Classical Linear Regression Model.   
This report will proceed by first outlining the general linear model and the 
problems associated with using this approach to model proportions.  Second, this report 
will consider a variety of alternate approaches that researchers have taken to model 
proportions.  These approaches can be divided into four broad categories: 1) transforming 
the proportion such that the response variable will be able to take on any real value before 
performing least squares estimation; 2) a censored regression model estimated by 
maximum likelihood in which the researcher erroneously assumes that the dependent 
variable is a latent variable normally distributed over ℝ, but is only observed over the 
interval [0, 1]; 3) a quasi-parametric Generalized Linear Model which models how only 
the mean proportion relates to explanatory variables; 4) Beta Regression, which 
implements a Generalized Linear Model assuming the dependent variable follows a beta 
distribution.  Last, this report will implement these methods using a case study and 
compare the results.   
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Chapter 2: Modeling Proportions with the General Linear Model 
Proportions data in a variety of fields is most commonly modeled using the 
general linear model and ordinary least squares estimation (Kieschnick and McCullough 
2003).  This report will first provide an overview of the general linear model and the 
associated assumptions and will then discuss some of the concerns regarding the use of 
this model with proportions data. 
The General Linear Model  
The general linear model is given by the equation: 
𝑌! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑥!! + 𝛽!𝑥!! +⋯+ 𝛽!𝑥!" + 𝜀!  i = 1, 2,…, n   (2.1) 
For a sample with n observations, there will be n such equations, which can be written in 
matrix terms as:  
 Y = X𝜷+   𝜺           (2.2) 
where Y is an n x 1 vector of responses, X is an n x k+1 model matrix with columns for 
regressors, β is a k+1 x 1 vector of regression coefficients, and ε is an n x 1 vector or 
errors.  The least squares estimators and the maximum-likelihood estimators for the 
multivariate linear model are equivalent, and are given by: 
 𝜷 = (X!X)!𝟏X!Y         (2.3) 
The full specification of the “classical normal linear regression model” not only includes 
the form of the regression equation in (1.1) and (1.2), but also the following key 
assumptions regarding the specification of the probability distribution of the disturbance, 
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or the error term εi (Kmenta 1997).  First, the expectation, or the mean, of εi is 0.  That is, 
E(εi) = 0.  This allows the expectation of the dependent variable to be a linear function of 
the explanatory variable.1  Second, εi is homoskedastic.  That is, Var(εi) = σ2, meaning 
every disturbance has the same, constant variance σ2 whose value is unknown.  Third, the 
disturbances are uncorrelated, that is any εi and εj are independent for i ≠ j.  This 
assumption of nonautocorreltion can be written Cov(εi, εj) = 0 where i ≠ j and will likely 
be met if the data are sampled independently from a large population.  Fourth, εi is 
normally distributed.  Specifically, εi ~ N(0, σ2) as given by the prior assumptions.  Last, 
the elements in X are non-stochastic with values fixed in repeated samples, and the 
matrix (1/n)(X’X) is nonsingular and its elements are finite as n approaches infinity.  One 
implication of this assumption is that E(εiXj) = XjE(εi) = 0 for all i, j (Fox 2008; Kmenta 
1997).  In matrix notation, these assumptions can be compactly written 𝜺 ~ N(0, σ2I) and 
imply Y ~ N(X𝛃, σ2I). 
Problems with Modeling Proportions Using the General Linear Model 
When the dependent variable is a proportion, several of the key classical linear 
regression assumptions are violated. The first problem with using ordinary least squares 
to model proportions is that the effect of the explanatory variables tends to be nonlinear 
since the conditional expectation function maps onto a bounded interval.  It is clear that 
proportions are not normally distributed since they are only defined in the interval (0, 1), 
and the normal distribution is defined over  ℝ, the set of all real numbers.  The general 
                                                
1 𝝁   ≡ 𝐸 𝐘 = 𝐸 𝒀 𝑿 = 𝐸 𝐗𝜷 +   𝜺 = 𝐗𝜷 + 𝐸 𝜺 =   𝐗𝜷   
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linear model assumes a conditional normal distribution for the model and that the 
conditional expectation function is linear—that is, E(Y|X) = Xβ in matrix notation for n 
equations. This is problematic for modeling proportions because the linear model cannot 
confine predicted values of Yi to the interval (0,1).  The fact that proportions are only 
observed over a closed interval implies that the conditional expectation function must be 
non-linear (Kieschnick and McCullough 2003).  The troubling implication of nonlinearity 
in a general linear regression model is that “the model fails to capture the systematic 
pattern of relationship between the response and the explanatory variables,” and the 
results of estimation can be severely misleading (Fox 2008: 227).2  For example, as 
previously mentioned, ordinary least squares estimation might generate impossible 
predicted values of the response variable, such as negative values or values greater than 
1.  The fact that a model to predict proportions could generate predictions that are not 
proportions provides a strong argument for departing from the general linear model.        
Another complication that arises when modeling proportions with general linear 
models is that the error variance tends to be heteroskedastic, approaching 0 as the mean 
gets closer to either of the boundaries (Kieschnick and McCullough 2003).  Constraints 
on the disturbance, which follow directly from constraints on the range of the dependent 
variable, also imply that the disturbance is data dependent.  The variance, therefore, will 
not be constant for all observations (Greene 2008).  Heteroskedasticity not only impairs 
the efficiency of the least-squares estimator, but also causes the standard error estimates 
to be biased and inconsistent, leading to incorrect confidence intervals, and ultimately 
                                                
2 In the case that the misspecification of the model is due to an omitted relevant explanatory variable, the 
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undermining inferences about the population coefficients.  Although it is possible to 
estimate a heteroskedastic OLS model, failing to model the variance as a function of the 
independent variables may lead researchers to overlook theoretically interesting aspects 
of the data generating process (Paolino 2001).  A third problem with using ordinary least 
squares on proportions data is that measures of proportions often display asymmetry, and 
the errors tend not to be normally distributed (Buis 2006; Ferrari and Cribari-Neto 2004).  
Although the violation of the assumption of normality seems relatively innocuous to least 
squares estimation because of the central-limit theorem, if the error distribution is highly 
skewed, it can compromise the interpretation of the least-squares fit (Fox 2008; Kmenta 
1997).   
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Chapter 3: Alternate Approaches to Modeling Proportions 
Transformations of the Dependent Variable 
One of the most common methods researchers use to surmount some of these 
problems is to transform the dependent variable.  Once the proportion has been 
transformed, researches will often proceed implementing ordinary least squares on the 
transformed response.  The most frequent practice is to perform the logit transformation 
on the dependent variable (Kieschnick and McCullough 2003; Paolino 2001).  The logit 
transformation, 
𝑦∗ = logit 𝑦 = ln !
!!!
       (3.1)  
is helpful because it removes the upper and lower bounds of the scale, spreads out the 
tails of the distribution, and makes the resulting values symmetric about 0 (Fox 2008).  In 
this approach, researchers estimate: 
 Y∗ = X𝜷+   𝜺           (3.2) 
where Y* represents the transformed response variable.  This method remedies the 
possibility of generating non-proportion expected values since the expectation can easily 
be transformed back to the original scale: 
 𝑦 =    !"#  (!
∗)
!!!"#  (!∗)
         (3.3) 
It has been shown that if y truly follows a logit-normal distribution with probability 
density function, 








,  x ∈ (0, 1)    (3.4) 
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then y* will follow a normal distribution, N(µ, σ2) and εi will follow a standard normal 
distribution (Aitchison 1986).  The assumption that y follows a logit-normal distribution 
can be verified by testing whether ε follows a standard normal distribution (Kieschnick 
and McCullough 2003).    
 A less frequently used transformation for modeling proportions is the probit 
transformation,  
 𝑦∗ = probit 𝑦 =   Φ!!(𝑦)       (3.5) 
where Ф–1 is the inverse cumulative distribution function for the standard normal 
distribution.3  The inverse of the cumulative distribution function (CDF) can be used here 
because the range of the CDF is [0, 1].4  The mapping of the response variable to a 
normal CDF produces a transformation very similar to that of the logit transformation.  In 
fact, logit ≈ (π/3)·probit when their scales are equated (Fox 2008).  One difference 
between the two is that the logit transformation has heavier tails compared to the probit, 
but this consideration is likely only relevant when the researcher is particularly interested 
in the proportions close to the tails (Hox 2010).  Neither the probit or logit 
transformations can be applied to proportions that are exactly 0 or exactly 1.  In the case 
that the response variable does take on the values of 0 or 1, the untransformed 
proportions can be mapped onto an interval that does not contain 0 or 1, and the logit 
transformation will be performed on the result.  For example, P’ = .025 + (.097·P) maps 
the proportion to the interval [.025, .097] where P is the original proportion.  This way, 
                                                
3 The inverse cumulative distribution function is also known as the quantile function.  The quantile function 
is well known in statistical analysis for its ability to diagnose deviations from normality via Q-Q plots.   
4 The range of any continuous CDF is [0, 1]. 
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when logit(P’) transformation is applied, even proportions that were initially 0 or 1 are 
transformed.  One drawback to this method is that neither transformation will remedy the 
violation of homoskedasticity (Kieschnick and McCullough 2003).5   
Tobit Model 
The Tobit Model, also called the censored regression model, is another model that 
researchers have used to model proportional data.  The original censored regression 
model, proposed by James Tobin in 1958, was designed for data censored to the left at 0 
and allowed the upper bound of the data to extend to infinity.  The model assumes that 
there is some latent response variable ξi whose values cannot be observed outside of a 
certain range (a, b).  The latent variable ξi is assumed to be normally distributed, such 
that N(µ, σ2), is assumed to be linearly related to the explanatory variables, such that 
𝜉! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑥!! + 𝛽!𝑥!! +⋯+ 𝛽!𝑥!" + 𝜀!      (3.6) 
and all of the other assumptions regarding the disturbance term from the normal 
regression model hold as well (Fox 2008).  In matrix notation, the regression equation 
can be written, 
  𝝃 = X𝜷+   𝜺           (3.7) 
Note that the dimensions of these matrices are equivalent to those defined in (2.2).  To 
analyze censored data, a new random variable yi*, transformed from the latent variable ξi, 
is defined:   
                                                
5 A less common, more archaic alternative transformation is the arcsine-square-root transformation which 






          
for  𝜉! ≤ 𝑎  
for  𝑎 ≤ 𝜉! ≤ 𝑏
for  𝜉! ≥ 𝑏
       (3.8) 
When a = 0 and b = ∞, the probability distribution that applies to the observed yi* is a 
mixture of discrete and continuous, given by Pr(yi* = 0) = Pr(ξi ≤ 0) = Ф(-µ/σ) = 1 – 
Ф(µ/σ), and if ξi > 0, then yi* has the density of ξi (Greene 2008).  Tobit models are 
typically estimated using the method of maximum likelihood estimation.  This because 
maximum likelihood is the method best suited to estimate models in which the 
parameters are related in a nonlinear way to the mean response function, as in (3.12).  For 
the case described above where a = 0 and b = ∞, the log-likelihood for censored 
regression model is  
ln 𝐿 =    ln    1−   Φ 𝐗𝜷
!
+    − !
!!
∗!! ln 2𝜋+  ln𝜎! +
(!∗!𝐗𝜷)!
!!!
∗!!  (3.9) 
  with marginal effects, 
!"[𝒀∗|𝐗]
!𝐗
=   𝜷×Pr(𝑎 < 𝑌∗ < 𝑏) (Greene 2008)     (3.10) 
When researchers use the Tobit model on proportional data, they assume 
everything previously stated except that ξi is censored from (0, 1), so the observed 
response variable yi* is defined by, 




            
for  𝜉! ≤ 0  
for  0 ≤ 𝜉! ≤ 1
for  𝜉! ≥ 1
       (3.11) 
The conditional expectation function for the observed data is, 
𝐸 𝒀∗ 𝐗 =   Φ 𝐗𝜷
!
𝐗𝜷+ 𝜎𝜆         where  𝜆 =
!(𝐗𝜷! )
!(𝐗𝜷! )
    (3.12) 
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The log-likelihood function in this case is  
ln 𝐿 =    ln 1−   Φ 𝐗𝜷
!






∗!!   
+ ln Φ 𝐗𝜷!!
!!
∗!!       (3.13) 
One of the primary problems with using the Tobit method is that for the data observed on 
the interval (0, 1) the regression results will be observationally equivalent to the general 
linear model, and so all the same criticisms from that model apply to the Tobit as well. 
Another, more theoretical, problem with Tobit is that it assumes ξi is normally 
distributed, but only observes values within the range [0, 1].  Proportions data provides 
observations from [0, 1] not because the variable of interest is censored, but rather 
because proportions are not defined outside this interval (Kieschnick and McCullough 
2003).  Using a censored regression model to model non-censored data is inherently 
troubling.  Furthermore, this approach also fails remedy the violation of homoskedasticity 
(Kieschnick and McCullough 2003).  In addition to impairing the ordinary least squares 
estimator, the presence of heteroskedasticity can cause very serious problems for the 
consistency of the maximum likelihood estimator (Greene 2008).6  Greene also notes that 
if the disturbances in a Tobit model are not normally distributed, then the maximum 
likelihood estimator is inconsistent (Greene 2008).    
                                                
6 The degree to which heteroskedasticity impairs the consistency of the maximum likelihood estimator 
depends on the degree of censoring (Greene 2008). 
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Fractional Logit Generalized Linear Model 
The Generalized Linear Model (GLM)7 is a generalization of linear regression 
that allows a linear model to be related to a response variable that follows a non-normal 
distribution, such as a distribution that generates proportion values, constrained to the 
interval [0,1] (Fox 2008).  A key component of a GLM is a smooth and invertible 
linearizing link function g(·) that transforms the mean of the response variable to the 
linear function of regressors.  Recall that E(Y) = µ.  
𝑔 𝜇 =   𝜂 = 𝑿𝜷        (3.14) 
where η is called the linear predictor – that is, the linear model.  The expected value of 
the response variable, µ, is linked to the linear predictor by the link function.  
Furthermore, because the link function is invertible, 
𝜇 =   𝑔!! 𝜂              (3.15) 
In the GLM framework, the conditional mean function of non-normally distributed 
random variables can be written in terms of a linear predictor and inverted link function 
as, 
𝐸(𝑦!   |  𝐗)   = 𝜇 =   𝑔!! 𝜂 =   𝑔!!(𝐗𝜷)     (3.16) 
and, therefore, the model is essentially a linear model for a transformation of the expected 
response (Fox 2008).  GLMs are fit to the data using the method of maximum likelihood 
estimation.  
                                                
7 Not to be confused with the general linear model. 
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Papke and Wooldridge develop a GLM for proportions data using quasi-
likelihood methods that others have termed “Fractional Logit” (Buis 2010; Papke and 
Wooldridge 1996).  They assume that, for all i = 1, 2, …, N,8  
 E(yi | xi) = g –1(xiβ)        (3.17) 
where 0 < yi < 1 and where g –1(z) is a known function satisfying 0 < g –1(z) < 1 for all 
𝑧 ∈ ℝ.  Under these conditions, the predicted values of y will lie in the interval (0, 1), and 
the conditional expectation function will be defined even if y takes on a value of exactly 0 
or 1 (Papke and Wooldridge 1996).  Note that no other assumption is made about the 
underlying structure that generates yi.  In this quasi-parametric approach, they do not 
explicitly model the probability distribution of the dependent variable; instead they 
simply assume a restricted range for the dependent variable and model how the mean 
proportion relates to the explanatory variables.  Papke and Wooldridge, as well as others 
implementing this model, choose the logistic function (i.e. the inverse-logit function) for 
g–1(·), such that g–1(z) = !"#  (!)
!!!"#  (!)
≡    !
!!!"#  (!!)
 , and so the link function g(·) is the logit 
link function given by (3.1), although the cumulative distribution function—that is, the 
inverse of the probit function—would be appropriate as well (Kieschnick and 
McCullough 2003; Papke and Wooldridge 1996).  The Bernoulli log-likelihood function, 
given by, 
ln 𝐿 = 𝑦! ln 𝑔!! 𝐱𝒊𝜷 + (1−𝑦!) ln[1− 𝑔!! 𝐱𝒊𝜷 ]      (3.18) 
                                                
8 Observations are assumed to be independent but not necessarily identically distributed.  The methods in 
Papke and Wooldridge (1996) also ignore the information on n since the fraction y may not be a proportion 
from a discrete group size.  
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which is defined for 0 < g –1(z) < 1 for all 𝑧 ∈ ℝ.  Although the distribution of yi is not 
specified, Papke and Wooldridge choose the Bernoulli log-likelihood because the 
Bernoulli is a member of the exponential family, because the log-likelihood function is 
easy to maximize, and because the quasi-maximum likelihood estimator of β is 
consistent, regardless of the true distribution of yi (Papke and Wooldridge 1996). A quasi-
maximum likelihood procedure is then used to estimate the parameters.    
Beta Regression 
In contrast to the quasi-parametric approach of the Fractional Logit GLM, another 
approach is to model the distribution of the dependent variable as a beta distribution.  The 
beta distribution is a continuous distribution defined on the interval [0, 1], and its 
probability density function is given by, 
𝑓! 𝑥;𝛼,𝛽 =   
! !!!
! ! ! !
𝑥!!!(1− 𝑥)!!!,                0 < 𝑥 < 1   (3.19) 
where α and β are both positive-valued shape parameters.  One of the most attractive 
features of the beta distribution is its versatility.  The density of the beta distribution can 
take on many different shapes depending on the values of the shape parameters.  
Illustration 1 demonstrates a few of the many possible shapes the density function can 
take. 
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 Illustration 1: Various Beta Probability Density Functions (“NIST/SEMATECH e-
Handbook of Statistical Methods” n.d.). 
The support and versatility of the beta distribution, therefore, makes it an 
attractive option for modeling proportions.  The mean of a beta distribution is given by, 
𝐸(𝑥) =    !
!!!
         (3.20) 
The drawback of modeling proportions using this conventional parameterization of the 
beta distribution is that parameter estimates are difficult to interpret.  In regression 
analysis, it is rarely interesting to estimate an explanatory variable’s relationship to a 
shape parameter.  It is much more desirable to model how the mean of the distribution of 
the dependent variable changes as the independent variables change (Buis 2006).   
As a solution to this problem, some scholars have use an alternative 
parameterization of the beta distribution that defines a location parameter equivalent to 
the mean of the response.  From (3.18), a new parameter µ is defined, such that, 
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𝐸 𝑦 𝐱 =    !
!!!
= 𝜇     where 0 < µ < 1     (3.21) 
and define a precision parameter 𝜙 = α+β, where 𝜙 > 0, so that α = 𝜇𝜙 and β = 
(1− 𝜇)𝜙.9  Using this alternative parameterization, the probability density function of a 
beta distributed random variable can be written, 
𝑓! 𝑦; 𝜇,𝜙 =   
! !
! !" ! (!!!)!
𝑦!"!!(1− 𝑦)(!!!)!!!,                0 < 𝑦 < 1      (3.22) 
and a beta-distributed random variable can now be modelled according to the structure of 
Generalized Linear Models specified in equation (3.15).  As in the Factional Logit model, 
either the logit link or the probit link are appropriate choices for link functions since the 
response variable is defined on the interval (0, 1), but most researchers who implement 
this method choose the logit link (Buis 2010; Ferrari and Cribari-Neto 2004; Kieschnick 
and McCullough 2003; Paolino 2001).  With this link function, the linear predictor can be 
written,  
𝜂 = 𝑔 𝜇 = ln !
!!!
= 𝑿𝜷       (3.23) 
implying the mean of y in terms of the new parameterization can therefore be written,   
𝐸 𝑦 𝒙 = 𝜇 = 𝑔!! = !"#  (𝐱𝜷)
!!!"#  (𝐱𝜷)
      (3.24) 
The log-likelihood function for the reparametarized beta distribution is then, 
ln 𝐿 = log Γ 𝜙 − log Γ 𝜇𝜙 − log Γ( 1− 𝜇 𝜙)+ 𝜇𝜙 − 1 log𝑦   
            +   1− 𝜇 𝜙 − 1 log Γ(1− 𝑦)     (3.25) 
                                                
9 The variance, 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑦 =    !"
(!!!)!(!!!!!)
 in the conventional parameterization, will become 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑦 =
  𝜇(1 − 𝜇) !
!!!
 in the alternative parameterization.  𝜙 can be interpreted as a precision parameter in that, 
when µ is held constant, as 𝜙 increases the variance of y decreases (Ferrari and Cribari-Neto 2004). 
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with µ defined so that (3.22) holds.  Estimates for β are derived by maximizing the log-
likelihood function with respect to the parameters β and 𝜙.  These estimates will retain 
all the desired properties of maximum likelihood estimators because the beta distribution 
is a member of the exponential family (Fox 2008).  One caveat of Beta Regression is that 
it cannot handle proportions that are exactly 0 or 1, however it is possible to employ the 
P’ = .025 + (.097·P) transformation on the dependent variable to push the extreme values 
slightly inwards (Buis 2006).10  
  
                                                
10 Alternatively, a zero-one inflated beta model can be used in the case that 0 and 1 observations occur as a 
result of processes distinct from that which generates all of other observation (Buis 2010).   
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Chapter 4: A Case Study on Party Difference Scores 
Within the context of legislative studies, one particular measure bounded from 0 
to 1 is the Party Difference Score.  Developed by sociologist Stuart Rice in the 1920s, it 
is also known as the Rice Difference Score and is calculated by taking the absolute 
difference between the proportion of Republicans and Democrats voting the same way on 
a given roll call vote (Rice 1925).   This index is, in essence, a measure of inter-group 
difference or dissimilarity.  Because it quantifies how unalike two parties are on a 
particular roll call vote or set of votes, legislative researchers commonly use the party 
difference score as a measure of party polarization and party conflict in the U.S. Congress 
(Lee 2009; Theriault 2008).  For example, if every legislator votes the same way on a 
given vote, the party difference score would be 0.  Further, if the same proportion of 
legislators from each party vote the same way, that is, if the extent of disagreement 
within one party on a vote is identical to the extent of disagreement within the opposing 
party, the party difference score for that vote will be 0.  When a vote is equally divisive 
of both parties, the party difference score of 0 indicates that the two parties’ preferences 
regarding that vote are not at all different from each other.  Higher values of the party 
difference score indicate greater degrees of dissimilarity in the parties’ preferences on 
given roll calls.  A party difference score of 1 would reveal a strict party-line vote in 
which every member of one party votes Yea and every member of the opposing party 
votes Nay.  Such a vote, in which every Democrat votes against every Republican, would 
indicate complete dissimilarity in the two parties’ preferences on that roll call. 
 19 
The party difference measure, one measure of party polarization, has played an 
important role in recent legislative studies because of the dramatic increase in 
polarization in the U.S. Congress since the 1970s.  Figure 1 illustrates the rise in party 
conflict in the House of Representatives from the 93rd Congress (1973-1975) to the 112th 
Congress (2010-2012) measured by the mean party difference score for all roll call votes 
for each Congress.   
Figure 1. 
The fitted line in the figure represents the results of simple regression analysis in which 
the mean party difference score for each congress is regressed on a time trend.  The 
ordinary least squares coefficient estimate for time is 0.015, and is statistically significant 
at the 0.001 level, indicating that, on average, the parties became 1.5 percentage points 
 20 
more divided on roll call votes each congress.  Some scholars have shown that different 
types of votes (e.g. procedural votes) and votes on different issues (e.g. economic issues, 
social issues, etc.) produce varying mean party difference scores (Lee 2009; Theriault 
2008).  Figures 2 shows mean party differences scores in the House for the 93rd to 108th 
Congresses by issue.  For further discussion on how votes are categorized into issue 
types, see Appendix A. 
 
Figure 2. 
Description of the data 
In a classic work, one of the founders of the behavioral revolution in political 
science distinguishes between position issues, on which candidates and parties take 
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positions along a left-right ideological spectrum, and valence issues, on which everyone 
holds the same position (Stokes 1963).  One example of a valence issue is government 
ethics; everyone is in favor of ethical behavior and no one is pro-corruption.  Good 
Government issues are a set of valence issues defined as efforts to improve the 
government’s integrity, efficiency, fairness, democratic accountability, and fiscal 
responsibility (Lee 2009).  Both liberals and conservatives support virtue in government, 
so the position of favoring integrity, efficiency, and fairness in government cannot be 
placed on an ideological, left-right continuum.  Good government issues can, 
nevertheless, be a source of conflict between political parties in Congress.11   In order to 
analyze whether votes on certain issues, such as good government issues, display higher 
levels of partisanship than others, researchers will employ multivariate regression on 
party difference scores for each vote (Lee 2009).  Lee shows that, controlling for issue, 
vote type, routine matters, and the factors specific to a given Congress, votes on good 
government issues are considerably more partisan than on the average vote in the Senate.  
Her conclusion comes from the fact that good government issues take a positive, 
statistically significant coefficient, indicating that, holding other factors constant, parties 
disagree more on good government votes than on the average vote in Congress.  As 
previously mentioned, most scholars, including Lee, simply model party difference 
scores with a general linear model and ordinary least squares estimation.  This report will 
                                                
11 For a full discussion of how and why valence issues can generate party conflict, see (Lee 2009). 
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conduct a similar analysis on votes in the House, implementing each approach described 
in Chapters 2 and 3, and will compares the results from each approach.12 
Comparison of the Results 
The first approach models the party difference scores using a general linear 
model.  Figure 3 presents the Normal Q-Q Plot for the General Linear Model residuals  
Figure 3.       Figure 4. 
 
 
and clearly indicates extreme departures from normality.  More formally, the Shapiro-
Wilk test rejects the normality of the residuals at 0.001 significance level.  Figure 4 plots 
the residuals against the fitted values.  Note that the manner in which the residuals 
deviate from 0 depends on the fitted values, implying a lack of linearity in the regression 
function and heteroskedasticity.  The Breusch-Pagan test for non-constant error variance 
rejects the homoskedasticity of the residuals at 0.001 significance level.  A summary of 
the fitted values also reveals that some fitted values do indeed fall outside of the [0, 1] 
                                                
12 This report will also control for whether or not the President has taken a position on the matter under 
consideration. 
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interval.  It is, therefore, clear that the general linear model is an inappropriate choice to 
model party difference scores.   
Figure 5.           Figure 6. 
Figure 5 presents the Normal Q-Q Plot for the residuals of the ordinary least 
squares model in which the response variable has been subject to a logit transformation.  
Although the Q-Q Plot indicates that the transformation has improved the normality, the 
Shapiro-Wilk test rejects the normality of the residuals at 0.001 significance level.  
Figure 6 plots the residuals against the fitted values.  The result is an improvement upon 
that of the original general linear model.  The residuals, however, seem to exhibit more 
deviation from 0 in the extremes of the fitted values than they do in the center. The 
results of the residual plot, however, may be more attributable to the covariates and their 
specification than the model.  As predicted in Chapter 3, the transformation did not 
stabilize the error variance, confirmed by the results of the Breusch-Pagan test, which 
reject the homoskedasticity of the residuals at 0.05 significance level.  Again, although 
this is an improvement from the original model, heteroskedasticity is still present.   
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Figure 7.             Figure 8. 
The second type of transformation of the response variable was a probit 
transformation.  Figure 7 presents the Normal Q-Q Plot for the residuals from the 
ordinary least squares model in which the response variable has been subject to a probit 
transformation.  Again, the residuals appear much more normal than in the original 
general linear model.  The Shapiro-Wilk test, however, rejects the normality of the 
residuals at 0.001 significance level.  Figure 8 plots the residuals against the fitted values.  
The residual plot is comparable to that for the logit transformed response.  The probit 
transformation appears to be slightly less preferable to the logit transformation in that the 
Breusch-Pagan test rejects the homoskedasticity of the residuals for the probit 
transformation at a much higher significance level.   
Considering that all three of these models display heteroskedasticity and non-
normal errors, none of the three of the models estimated with ordinary least squares, 
however, seem very appropriate for proportional data.  This conclusion is consistent with 
what other researchers have found, suggesting that the conditional expectation function is 
non-linear and that OLS will produce incorrect standard errors (Kieschnick and 
McCullough 2003; Paolino 2001).  The Tobit model is not very appropriate for 
proportional data either, given that there is no theoretical justification to assume the 
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dependent variable is normally distributed but can only be observed on (0, 1).  
Furthermore, even though the censored model is estimated using maximum likelihood, 
for the interval on which the data are actually observed the regression results will be 
identical to those of the general linear model, and so all the criticisms that apply to the 
general linear model for proportional data apply to the Tobit model as well.   
These criticisms do not apply to the Fractional Logit model or the Beta regression 
model.  The Fractional logit model explicitly models how the mean proportion relates to 
the explanatory variables, and Beta regression fully captures the distribution of the 
dependent variable.  The beta distribution also models the non-constant variance, as the 
variance of a beta-distributed variable is a function of the mean.  Akaike’s Information 
Criteria (AIC) is reported in Table 1 for each model in order to provide a formal 
comparison between the models.13  The AIC statistics suggest that, of the six models 
compared in this report, the Beta Regression model is unequivocally the best, followed 
by the Fractional Logit model.  In fact, the probit and logit transformed responses are the 
least desirable models, even compared to the original general linear model.  These 
findings are consistent with other scholarship on this matter (Kieschnick and McCullough 
2003; Paolino 2001).  Using simulation techniques, Paolino finds that Beta Regression 
estimates are less biased and efficient than normal-linear approaches, “especially when 
the dependent variable has been transformed” (Paolino 2001: 332).     
 
                                                















Good Government 0.036*** 0.281*** 0.148*** 0.036*** 0.165*** 0.124***
(0.007) (0.051) (0.027) (0.007) (0.036) (0.029)
Economic 0.119*** 0.803*** 0.440*** 0.119*** 0.552*** 0.445***
(0.007) (0.053) (0.028) (0.007) (0.036) (0.030)
Social 0.048*** 0.279*** 0.159*** 0.048*** 0.228*** 0.163***
(0.006) (0.041) (0.022) (0.006) (0.025) (0.023)
Defense -0.027*** -0.163** -0.090** -0.027*** -0.139*** -0.087**
(0.007) (0.053) (0.028) (0.007) (0.034) (0.030)
Foreign -0.045*** -0.336*** -0.178*** -0.045*** -0.233*** -0.169***
(0.007) (0.052) (0.028) (0.007) (0.034) (0.030)
Type of vote
Procedural 0.052*** 0.280*** 0.164*** 0.052*** 0.223*** 0.183***
(0.005) (0.039) (0.020) (0.005) (0.025) (0.022)
Passage -0.201*** -1.514*** -0.803*** -0.201*** -1.001*** -0.808***
(0.005) (0.036) (0.019) (0.005) (0.024) (0.021)
Routine Matters
Appropriations 0.030*** 0.337*** 0.164*** 0.030*** 0.134*** 0.168***
(0.005) (0.038) (0.020) (0.005) (0.023) (0.021)
Purely symbolic -0.205*** -1.707*** -0.883*** -0.205*** -1.560*** -0.720***
(0.041) (0.294) (0.155) (0.041) (0.296) (0.166)
Presidential Leadership 0.115*** 0.893*** 0.470*** 0.115*** 0.574*** 0.477***
(0.006) (0.042) (0.022) (0.006) (0.025) (0.024)
Congress
. . . 
96th Congress 0.034** 0.139 0.089* 0.034** 0.224*** 0.027
(0.011) (0.079) (0.042) (0.011) (0.049) (0.045)
97th Congress 0.002 -0.095 -0.038 0.001 0.051 -0.103*
(0.012) (0.089) (0.047) (0.012) (0.057) (0.051)
. . . 
AIC 3120.83 72298.06 49948.02 3159.96 0.94 -10019.55
Standard errors are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates.  *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
The Effect of Issue, Vote Type, and Routine Matters on Party Conflict Compared Across Models
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Table 1 presents the coefficient estimates for selected predictor variables and the 
AIC statistic for each model.14  The substantive explanatory coefficients are included in 
the table as well as the results displaying the most discrepancies between models.   In 
spite of the shortcomings of the nearly all of the models, except the Fractional Logit and 
the Beta Regression models, the inferences made from the coefficient estimates would 
not differ too much from one model to the next.  Absent a direct comparison of the values 
of the estimates, the inferences made from any of the six models would be relatively 
similar for all but two coefficients.  In order to compare the values of the coefficient 
estimates directly, the transformation estimates could be mapped back into effects in the 
0 to 1 scale as described earlier in Chapter 3.  Regardless of model selection, the 
significance of the coefficient for good government votes indicates that more party 
conflict occurs on good government issues that on the average issue.   
The coefficients for the 96th Congress are statistically significant in all models 
except for the Beta regression model and the logit transformed response model, and the 
coefficients for the 97th Congress are never significant except in the Beta regression 
model.  In this model, the indicators for each congress function mostly as a control in 
order to account for broader factors specific to a given Congress (such as divided or 
unified government, the majority party’s margin of control, etc.).  The significance of the 
coefficients for each Congress does not notably affect the inferences that might be taken 
from the model, so one might be tempted to dismiss the fact that the significance is not 
constant for all models.  This would be a mistake because in some other model, it could 
easily be the key explanatory variable of interest that varies in significance across 
models.  The results in this case study confirms what others have shown: some models 
                                                
14 See Appendix B for full regression results for each model.   
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may not pick up on the significance of a regressor and other models may provide a falsely 
significant estimate, resulting in Type I and Type II errors made in inference (Kieschnick 
and McCullough 2003).  The importance of being discriminating with regard to model 
choice is clear.   
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Chapter 5: Conclusion  
One drawback of this report is that it only provided one case study.  Further 
research should test these results implementing additional simulations and with a greater 
diversity of explanatory variables, in order to confirm that these conclusions hold 
regardless of the type of predictor variables.  It may also be important to conduct more 
rigorous model specification tests as well.  Future work might also extend this type of 
analysis to Bayesian models and time-series models.  Indeed, some work on Dynamic 
Bayesian beta models is already being conducted (da-Silva et al. 2011).    
In conclusion, it is clear that model choice matters, especially when modeling 
proportional data.  Although commonly implemented, models that assume a normally 
distributed response for proportions or attempt to transform proportions to achieve 
normality are inferior to the alternative approaches.  Specifically, normal models can lead 
to incorrect inferences.  Beta regression is unequivocally the best approach for modeling 
proportions.  Fractional Logit is an acceptable alternative as well, although there is 
evidence that Beta Regression generally outperforms Fractional Logit.  It is therefore 
unclear under what conditions the Fractional Logit might be preferred.  If a researcher 
does wish to use a normal model, they are better off not transforming the dependent 
variable, as the transformed variable models both performed the worst of all the models 
considered.  Although the censored regression model may take the limit on the dependent 
variable into account, its results are observationally equivalent to the general linear 
model.  Further, the censored model’s assumption that the proportions are merely the 
observed values of a latent normally distributed variable is no more theoretically sound 
than the assumption that the proportion is normally distributed.  If Beta Regression or 
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Fractional Logit are not used, the general linear model or the Tobit model will perform 




Appendix A: Notes on Coding 
The independent variables in the case study were coded using the Political 
Institutions and Public Choice House Roll-Call Database, maintained by David Rohde at 
Duke University, and using the Policy Agendas Project (PAP).   The data used from the 
Policy Agendas Project were originally collected by Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. 
Jones, with the support of National Science Foundation grant numbers SBR 9320922 and 
0111611, and were distributed through the Department of Government at the University 
of Texas at Austin. Neither NSF nor the original collectors of the data bear any 
responsibility for the analysis reported here.   
Votes coded as “Economic” were those coded into the Macroeconomics and 
Banking, Finance, and Domestic Commerce major topic codes in the PAP coding 
scheme.  “Social Issues” were those coded into the Civil Rights; Law, Crime, and Family 
Issues; Health; Education; Social Welfare; Labor, Employment, and Immigration; and 
Community Development and Housing Issues major topic codes in the PAP coding 
scheme.  “Defense” votes were those coded into the Defense major topic code in the PAP 
coding scheme.  “Foreign Issues” were those coded into the Foreign Trade and 
International Affairs and Foreign Aid major topic codes in the PAP coding scheme.  
“Good Government” measures are those that fight corruption, uphold ethical standards, 
investigate failures, collect and report information, promote fiscal responsibility, ensure 
electoral integrity, and make government operations more efficient (Lee 2009).  Votes 
coded as “Good Government Issues” were, therefore, those coded into the Government 
Efficiency and Bureaucratic Oversight; Government Employee Benefits, Civil Service 
Issues; Government Procurement, Procurement Fraud and Contractor Management; 
Presidential Impeachment and Scandal; Federal Government Branch Relations and 
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Administrative Issues, Congressional Operations; Regulation of Political Campaigns, 
Political Advertising, PAC Regulation, Voter Registration, Government Ethics; and 
Census minor topic codes within the Government Operations major topic code in the 
PAP coding scheme.  Votes coded as “Appropriations” were those coded as such in the 
Rohde/PIPC Roll Call Database.  “Purely Symbolic” votes are resolutions that express 
House or congressional sentiment.  To be classified in this category, the resolution cannot 
require any action from the executive branch or have any other policy content according 
to the Rohde/PIPC coding scheme.    
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Appendix B: Results Tables 
      β	   Std. Error         	  	  
  
        
  
Type of issue 




  Good Government  0.036*** (0.007) 
    
  
  




  Economic 
 
0.119*** (0.007) 
    
  
  
     
Adj. R2 0.259 
 
  
  Social 
 
0.048*** (0.006) 
    
  
  
        
  
  Defense 
 
-0.027*** (0.007) 
    
  
  
        
  
  Foreign 
 
-0.045*** (0.007) 
    
  
  
        
  
Type of vote 
       
  
  Procedural  
 
0.052*** (0.005) 
    
  
  
        
  
  Passage 
 
-0.201*** (0.005) 
    
  
  
        
  
Routine Matters 
      
  
  Appropriations 0.030*** (0.005) 
    
  
  
        
  
  Purely symbolic -0.205*** (0.041) 
    
  
  
        
  
Presidential Leadership 0.115*** (0.006) 
    
  
  
        
  
Congress 
       
  
  94th Congress 0.058*** (0.011) 
    
  
  95th Congress 0.009 (0.011) 
    
  
  96th Congress 0.034** (0.011) 
    
  
  97th Congress 0.002 (0.012) 
    
  
  98th Congress 0.092*** (0.012) 
    
  
  99th Congress 0.147*** (0.012) 
    
  
  100th Congress 0.158*** (0.012) 
    
  
  101st Congress 0.120*** (0.012) 
    
  
  102nd Congress 0.175*** (0.012) 
    
  
  103rd Congress 0.240*** (0.011) 
    
  
  104th Congress 0.269*** (0.011) 
    
  
  105th Congress 0.193*** (0.011) 
    
  
  106th Congress 0.156*** (0.011) 
    
  
  107th Congress 0.154*** (0.012) 
    
  
  108th Congress 0.231*** (0.011) 
    
  
  
     
Note:   
  
  
Constant  0.257*** (0.009)  *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001   
Table 2.  OLS Estimation Results. 
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   β	   Std. Error     	  
          
Type of issue     F-statistic: 215.5***   
 Good Government  0.281*** (0.051)      
      N 17482   
 Economic  0.803*** (0.053)      
      Adj. R2 0.235   
 Social  0.279*** (0.041)      
          
 Defense  -0.163** (0.053)      
          
 Foreign  -
0.336*** 
(0.052)      
          
Type of vote         
 Procedural   0.280*** (0.039)      
          
 Passage  -
1.514*** 
(0.036)      
          
Routine Matters         
 Appropriations 0.337*** (0.038)      
          
 Purely symbolic -
1.707*** 
(0.294)      
          
Presidential Leadership 0.893*** (0.042)      
          
Congress         
 94th Congress 0.354*** (0.079)      
 95th Congress 0.038 (0.076)      
 96th Congress 0.139 (0.079)      
 97th Congress -0.095 (0.089)      
 98th Congress 0.396*** (0.086)      
 99th Congress 0.775*** (0.086)      
 100th Congress 0.158*** (0.086)      
 101st Congress 0.616*** (0.087)      
 102nd Congress 0.882*** (0.087)      
 103rd Congress 1.276*** (0.082)      
 104th Congress 1.588*** (0.079)      
 105th Congress 0.956*** (0.081)      
 106th Congress 0.642*** (0.081)      
 107th Congress 0.628*** (0.085)      
 108th Congress 1.098*** (0.080)      
      Note:      
Constant  -1.504*** (0.068)  *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001  
Table 3. OLS Results for Logit Tansformed Response. 
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      β	   Std. Error         	  	  
  
        
  
Type of issue 




  Good Government  0.148*** (0.027) 
    
  
  




  Economic 
 
0.440*** (0.028) 
    
  
  
     
Adj. R2 0.246 
 
  
  Social 
 
0.159*** (0.022) 
    
  
  
        
  
  Defense 
 
-0.090** (0.028) 
    
  
  
        
  
  Foreign 
 
-0.178*** (0.028) 
    
  
  
        
  
Type of vote 
       
  
  Procedural  
 
0.164*** (0.020) 
    
  
  
        
  
  Passage 
 
-0.803*** (0.019) 
    
  
  
        
  
Routine Matters 
      
  
  Appropriations 0.164*** (0.020) 
    
  
  
        
  
  Purely symbolic -0.883*** (0.155) 
    
  
  
        
  
Presidential Leadership 0.470*** (0.022) 
    
  
  
        
  
Congress 
       
  
  94th Congress 0.200*** (0.042) 
    
  
  95th Congress 0.023 (0.040) 
    
  
  96th Congress 0.089* (0.042) 
    
  
  97th Congress -0.038 (0.047) 
    
  
  98th Congress 0.248*** (0.046) 
    
  
  99th Congress 0.452*** (0.046) 
    
  
  100th Congress 0.465*** (0.045) 
    
  
  101st Congress 0.365*** (0.045) 
    
  
  102nd Congress 0.527*** (0.046) 
    
  
  103rd Congress 0.748*** (0.044) 
    
  
  104th Congress 0.901*** (0.042) 
    
  
  105th Congress 0.576*** (0.043) 
    
  
  106th Congress 0.413*** (0.042) 
    
  
  107th Congress 0.0406*** (0.045) 
    
  
  108th Congress 0.675*** (0.042) 
    
  
  
     
Note:   
  
  
Constant   -0.843*** (0.036)   *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001   
Table 4. OLS Results for Probit Transformed Response. 
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      β	   Std. Error         	  	  
  
        
  
Type of issue 
    
Chi-squared (25): 5268.8***   
  Good Government  0.036*** (0.007) 
    
  
  
     
N 
 
17482   
  Economic 
 
0.119*** (0.007) 
    
  
  
     
Pseudo. R2 
 
0.6291   
  Social 
 
0.048*** (0.006) 
    
  
  
     
Log-Likelihood: -1552.98   
  Defense 
 
-0.027*** (0.007) 
    
  
  
     
Log σ: 
 
-1.331***   
  Foreign 
 
-0.045*** (0.007) 
   
(-0.005)   
  
        
  
Type of vote 
       
  
  Procedural  
 
0.052*** (0.005) 
    
  
  
        
  
  Passage 
 
-0.201*** (0.005) 
    
  
  
        
  
Routine Matters 
      
  
  Appropriations 0.030*** (0.005) 
    
  
  
        
  
  Purely symbolic -0.205*** (0.041) 
    
  
  
        
  
Presidential Leadership 0.115*** (0.006) 
    
  
  
        
  
Congress 
       
  
  94th Congress 0.058*** (0.011) 
    
  
  95th Congress 0.009 (0.011) 
    
  
  96th Congress 0.034** (0.011) 
    
  
  97th Congress 0.002 (0.012) 
    
  
  98th Congress 0.092*** (0.012) 
    
  
  99th Congress 0.147*** (0.012) 
    
  
  100th Congress 0.158*** (0.012) 
    
  
  101st Congress 0.120*** (0.012) 
    
  
  102nd Congress 0.175*** (0.012) 
    
  
  103rd Congress 0.240*** (0.011) 
    
  
  104th Congress 0.269*** (0.011) 
    
  
  105th Congress 0.193*** (0.011) 
    
  
  106th Congress 0.156*** (0.011) 
    
  
  107th Congress 0.0154*** (0.012) 
    
  
  108th Congress 0.231*** (0.011) 
    
  
  
     
Note:   
  
  
Constant   0.257*** 0.009   *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001   
Table 5. MLE Results for Tobit Model. 
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      β	   Std. Error         	  	  
  
        
  
Type of issue 




  Good Government  0.165*** (0.036) 
 
pseudolikelihood:  -8184.2   
  
        
  






17492   
  
        
  






6223.3   
  
        
  






5652.0   
  
        
  
  Foreign 
 
-0.233*** (0.034) 
    
  
  
        
  
Type of vote 
       
  
  Procedural  
 
0.223*** (0.025) 
    
  
  
        
  
  Passage 
 
-1.001*** (0.024) 
    
  
  
        
  
Routine Matters 
      
  
  Appropriations 0.134*** (0.023) 
    
  
  
        
  
  Purely symbolic -1.560*** (0.296) 
    
  
  
        
  
Presidential Leadership 0.574*** (0.025) 
    
  
  
        
  
Congress 
       
  
  94th Congress 0.335*** (0.046) 
    
  
  95th Congress 0.0699 (0.046) 
    
  
  96th Congress 0.224*** (0.049) 
    
  
  97th Congress 0.051 (0.057) 
    
  
  98th Congress 0.517*** (0.053) 
    
  
  99th Congress 0.766*** (0.050) 
    
  
  100th Congress 0.822*** (0.050) 
    
  
  101st Congress 0.643*** (0.051) 
    
  
  102nd Congress 0.887*** (0.052) 
    
  
  103rd Congress 1.158*** (0.051) 
    
  
  104th Congress 1.285*** (0.048) 
    
  
  105th Congress 0.972*** (0.053) 
    
  
  106th Congress 0.812*** (0.056) 
    
  
  107th Congress 0.807*** (0.057) 
    
  
  108th Congress 1.158*** (0.052) 
    
  
  
     
Note:   
  
  
Constant   -1.158*** (0.040)   *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001   
Table 6. QMLE Results for Fractional Logit. 
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      μ	   Std. Error         	  	  
  
        
  
Type of issue 
    
Chi-suqared (25): 4295.5***   
  Good Government  0.124*** (0.029) 
    
  
  
     
N 
 
17482   
  Economic 
 
0.445*** (0.030) 
    
  
  
     
Pseudo R2 
 
0.235   
  Social 
 
0.163*** (0.023) 
    
  
  
     
Log Likelihood: 5037   
  Defense 
 
-0.087** (0.030) 
    
  
  
     
Phi 
 
2.095***   
  Foreign 
 
-0.169*** (0.030) 
   
(0.020)   
  
        
  
Type of vote 
       
  
  Procedural  
 
0.183*** (0.022) 
    
  
  
        
  
  Passage 
 
-0.808*** (0.021) 
    
  
  
        
  
Routine Matters 
      
  
  Appropriations 0.168*** (0.021) 
    
  
  
        
  
  Purely symbolic -0.720*** (0.166) 
    
  
  
        
  
Presidential Leadership 0.477*** (0.024) 
    
  
  
        
  
Congress 
       
  
  94th Congress 0.187*** (0.045) 
    
  
  95th Congress -.005 (0.043) 
    
  
  96th Congress 0.027 (0.045) 
    
  
  97th Congress -0.103* (0.051) 
    
  
  98th Congress 0.184*** (0.049) 
    
  
  99th Congress 0.420*** (0.050) 
    
  
  100th Congress 0.447*** (0.049) 
    
  
  101st Congress 0.340*** (0.050) 
    
  
  102nd Congress 0.497*** (0.049) 
    
  
  103rd Congress 0.792*** (0.047) 
    
  
  104th Congress 0.915*** (0.045) 
    
  
  105th Congress 0.547*** (0.046) 
    
  
  106th Congress 0.394*** (0.046) 
    
  
  107th Congress 0.0409*** (0.048) 
    
  
  108th Congress 0.669*** (0.046) 
    
  
  
     
Note:   
  
  
Constant   -0.859*** 0.039   *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001   
Table 8. MLE Results for Beta Regression. 
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